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RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON THE FORMATION OF A 
VIABLE LATINO-ASIAN PACIFIC 
POLITICAL COALITION 
by James S. Lai 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Political Science 
University of Southern California 
Editor's Note: The following article is a case study of the 1994 California 
Assembly District primary election. The author would like to thank Dr. 
Michael B. Preston for his constructive comments. He would also like to 
thank those at the 1996 Western Political Science Association Conference in 
San Francisco for their helpful suggestions. 
INTRODUCTION 
In "Paths To Political Incorporation For Latinos and Asian Pacifies in 
California," Steven P. Erie, Harold Brackman, and James Warren Ingram Ill 
(Erie et al.) examined the potentials and barriers for political incorporation of 
Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Pacifies in California. According to 
their findings, they argue that a bi-racial political coalition between Latinos 
and Asian Pacifies is likely based on the following factors: language and 
immigration issues. They stated: 
Regarding a possible Latino alliance with Asian Pacifies, there 
appears to be a strong basis for collaboration on behalf of an 
immigrant rights agenda and in opposition to resurgent Anglo 
nativism. The two groups converge to the center on attitudes 
about economic development and crime, facilitating coalition 
building. However, the prospects for a durable alliance remain 
problematic ... The most serious barrier to constructing a 
Latino/Asian Pacific coalition may be political rather than socio-
economic. Because of diffuse and commingled Latino and Asian 
Pacific residential patterns in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, 
political rivalries are structurally built into ongoing reapportion-
ment dynamics (Erie, Brackman, and Warren Ill, 1993, p. 4). 
In short, what Erie et al. argue is that the prospects for a Latino-Asian Pacific 
political coalition are high when they are centered on policy issues like immi-
gration and language (e.g. English-only referendums). However, when a 
Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition is centered on political issues such as 
constructing political boundaries and elected representation, the chances 
are less likely. In contrast to this theory, Leland T. Saito stated in "Asian 
Americans and Latinos in San Gabriel Valley, California: lnterethnic Political 
Cooperation and Redistricting: 1990-92," that a Latino-Asian redistricting 
and reapportionment coalition in San Gabriel Valley was able to form. The 
reason according to Saito was due primarily to the fact that the number of 
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Asian Pacific registered voters was not significant enough to be a threat to a 
Latino candidate. Thus, Latino coalition leaders were able to agree with the 
Asian Pacific leaders' redistricting plan without endangering the reelection 
chances of an incumbent Latino candidate. However, an analysis of the 
1994 49th Assembly district primary election will illustrate factors limiting bi-
racial coalition building. This election represented a political challenge to 
the assumption underlying the 1990 redistricting agreement between the 
Latinos and Asian Pacifies, which was that a political district could be 
redrawn to reelect a Latino representative. The assumption in 1994 that 
Diane Martinez could be reelected was threatened by the arrival of a strong 
Asian Pacific candidate, Judy Chu, who possessed both a strong name 
recognition and a previous track record in Monterey Park. 
The places represented in the 1994 49th Assembly district were the follow-
ing: Alhambra, Belvedere, East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Monterey Park, 
Rio Hondo, Rosemead, San Gabriel, South San Gabriel, and Temple City. 
The constituencies in these cities have been both predominantly Democratic 
and Latino. However, with the increased demographic growth and subse-
quent political incorporation of Asian Pacifies over the last three decades, 
particularly in the cities of Monterey Park and Alhambra where they currently 
represent a majority of the population, the potential for increased political 
conflict between Latinos and Asian Pacifies is great. For example, in 
Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and San Gabriel Valley, the percent-
ages of Asian Pacifies of the total population were 38.1%, 57 .5%, 34.3%, 
and 32.4%, respectively (Ong and Azores, 1991, p. 14). 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous studies conducted to determine the effects of a candidate's race 
on a minority group-'s voting preferences (e.g. racially polarized voting) have 
focused traditionally on African American voters. There exists a modicum of 
studies conducted on the voting behavior of other minority groups such as 
Asian Pacific and Latino voters. The central issue in these studies centers 
around the methodological approaches of measuring racially polarized voting. 
Illustrating direct correlation between racial bloc voting and racial candidates 
is problematic. The ecological fallacy represents one such problem. One 
cannot assume that ethnic groups vote homogeneously along ethnic lines 
without taking into consideration other important socio-economic status vari-
ables (e.g. education levels; political ideology). Compounding this problem 
is the unavailability of census data at the election precinct level which will 
allow one to incorporate such data. The U.S. Census bureau does not pro-
vide such information which correlates directly to election precinct return 
information of key state and local elections. Thus, the absence of such 
information and an exit poll make it very difficult to illustrate direct correla-
tion. As will be illustrated, there exist two methods of addressing the eco-
logical fallacy issue. One methodological model employed by some scholars 
include symbolic racism and realistic group conflict which utilize survey meth-
ods to explain one racial group voters' attitude toward another racial groups' 
candidate. A second method, which is non-survey oriented, has been to ana-
lyze ethnic and racial representation at the census tract level to correlate 
with election precinct returns, and then argue with some degree of likelihood 
that racial bloc voting occurred. This method has been critiqued by statisti-
cians who attempt to predict racial bloc voting behavior with a high degree of 
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certainty and a low degree of error through ecological regression models. It 
is important to note that such models also cannot illustrate direct correlation 
but can incorporate other socio-economic variables mentioned previously into 
their analysis provided the existence of an exit poll. 
METHOD ONE: SYMBOLIC RACISM AND 
REALISTIC GROUP CONFLICT 
There exists two competing theories: symbolic racism and realistic group 
conflict, in which both attempt to explain the effects of a candidate's race on 
both African American and Caucasian voter attitudes. Symbolic racism 
attempts to explain the political roles of Caucasian voter's attitudes to 
African American candidates. According to a proponent, it is a joint function 
of anti-African American affect and traditional Protestant ethnic values 
(Sears, p. 56). Therefore, it is important to note that many of the studies on 
symbolic racism focus on Caucasian voter's perceptions of African American 
candidates. Realistic group conflict studies, in contrast, focus on both 
African American and Caucasian voters. This theory argues that the central 
political motive is the protection of group privilege which can be measured by 
determining the group members' perception of tangible out-group threat 
(Bovasso, p. 5). 
In attempting to measure the influences of a candidate's race on African 
American and Caucasian voters' political motives from either a symbolic 
racism or realistic group conflict perspective, many studies have relied on 
various survey techniques such as self-administered questionnaires [David 
Sears and R. Kinder (1970, 1971); T. F. Pettigrew (1971); J.B. Mcconahay 
and J.C. Hough Jr. (1976), Moskowitz and Stroh (1994)], national survey 
data [Lawrence Bobo (1985)] , and telephone surveys [Bovasso (1993)]. 
In the Sears and Kinder studies in 1970 and 1971, the authors introduced 
the concept of symbolic racism by examining the findings of a survey during 
the Los Angeles mayoral elections of 1969 which pitted an African American 
candidate, Tom Bradley, against a Caucasian candidate, Sam Yorty. The sur-
vey was created by Thomas Pettigrew who also examined Caucasian voters' 
responses to African American mayoral candidates. The questions that the 
survey used to measure symbolic racism were divided into three categories: 
1) Antagonisms towards African Americans' demands; 2) Resentment about 
special favors for African Americans; and 3) Denial of continuing discrimina-
tion (Sears, p. 57). The findings of the questions in each category illustrated 
anti-African American affect in terms of antagonism, resentment, and anger 
towards African Americans' wishes and lack of sympathy for them (Ibid}. 
In the Moskowitz and Stroh study, the authors support the symbolic racism 
perspective. They employed a self-administered questionnaire distributed to 
a non-probability sample of 424 Caucasian subjects by students in several 
undergraduate political science courses at Georgia Southern University dur-
ing Fall 1990 to Winter 1991. The authors manipulated the race of a hypo-
thetical candidate to determine how the candidate's race influences voter 
preference through stereotype biases along with other "affect-laden" impacts 
of racial prejudice. The questionnaire was designed in two-sections. The 
first section was used to determine respondent's feelings about a public pol-
icy issue. The second section contained three items designed to elicit and 
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measure racist feelings about African Americans and asked them to respond 
to a seven point scale (One-strongly agree; Seven-strongly disagree): 
(1) Over the past few years the government and news media have 
shown more respect to blacks than they deserve. 
(2) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more than they 
deserve. 
(3) Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. 
Once the respondents completed the questionnaire, they were then asked to 
look at a campaign brochure of a fictitious candidate whose picture was 
included as either an African American or Caucasian candidate. The authors 
found "that the more racist an individual, the more likely the individual pro-
jects the opposite of his or her position onto blacks"(Moskowitz and Stroh , 
p. 325). In other words, the more racist a voter was, the lower his or her 
evaluation of the African American candidate would be. 
Lawrence Bobo, a proponent of realistic group conflict theory, also utilized a 
survey technique in 1988 to determine that racial group conflict is realistic 
when it involves a group oriented concern for the redistribution of power, 
wealth, and status of conflicting groups. In particular, Bobo looked at 
Caucasian voter opposition to busing and attitudes toward African American 
political activism. In regard to the latter, Bobo found that Caucasian voters 
perceived African American candidates and public policy as a threat to the 
redistribution of power and wealth in what he termed as the "paradox of 
racial attitudes. " The paradox lies in Bobo's 1988 national survey findings 
which illustrated that Caucasians, in general, were beginning to become 
more accepting of African American social and political equality over a long 
period while at the same time were becoming less tolerant of public policies 
intended to achieve these forms of equality. 
Another survey technique utilized to measure the influences of a candidate's 
race on African American voters' preferences is the telephone survey of a 
random population sample . In the Bovasso study, an attempt was made to 
determine whether "the perception of racial out-group threat and dissatisfac-
tion with public resources predicted candidate support in registered 
Democrats" (Bovasso, p. 6). Bovasso was interested in measuring both 
African American and Caucasian voters' perceptions to determine their dif-
ferent motives of racial politics in the context of the symbolic racism and 
realistic group conflict debate. 
Bovasso took a random sample of 1,935 New York City voters in the 1988 
Democratic New York City Mayoral race in which incumbent Edward Koch and 
David Dinkins were the candidates, and then used a random digit dialing 
technique to implement a questionnaire. The format of the questionnaire 
was designed to determine whether African American and Caucasian voters' 
would reelect Koch as oppossed to the other Republican and Democratic 
challengers : 
Some people say that Mayor Koch is doing a good job and 
deserves to be reelected while others say that he should step 
aside to make way for new leaders. What do you think: do you 
support Mayor Koch or would you like to see someone else for 
mayor? 
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Bovasso used responses to the aforementioned question to determine indi-
rectly how Caucasian voters would vote for the African American candidate, 
David Dinkins. The findings from the telephone survey supported both sym-
bolic racism and realistic group conflict perspectives. 
METHOD TWO: ADDRESSING THE ECOLOGICAL 
FALLACY THROUGH NON-SURVEY METHODS 
A second method employed by some scholars is to overlay census tract data 
over election precincts to determine the likelihood of racially polarized voting. 
One problem with this method is that all election precincts within a political 
district do not always fit within a census tract, nor do all census tracts fit 
exactly within a political district. However, such methods are not uncommon 
and have traditionally been the standard. In Elmer R. Rusco's study, "Voting 
Patterns of Racial Minorities in Nevada"; Grant Din's study, "An Analysis of 
Asian Pacific American Registration and Voting Patterns in San Francisco"; 
and Henry Der's study, "Bilingual Ballot Foes Disagree on Statistics," all of 
these authors employed this methodology to illustrate racially polarized vot-
ing among African American, Latino, and Asian Pacific American voters. 
The above methodology has not been accepted without criticism. One such 
criticism is that the above methodology assumes that ethnic and racial 
groups vote homogeneously along ethnic and racial lines. Freedman et. al. 
in their study, Ecological Regression and Voting Rights, have argued that by 
violating this principle, this can lead to unreliable results. Others such as 
Engstrom and McDonald in their study, "Quantitative Evidence in Vote 
Dilution Litigation," argue that the correlation co-efficient does not adequate-
ly demonstrate the relationship between individual correlations and ecologi-
cal correlations. Thus, the non-survey models of measuring racially-polarized 
voting is at its infancy, and other innovative models have been developed by 
others. In Wendy Tam's study, "Asians-A Monolithic Voting Bloc?," she 
attempts to address the above difficulties by developing a specific aggregat-
ed multinomial model which treats socio-economic values of Asian Pacifies 
as nonlinearly related as opposed to the traditional linear analysis. 
Nevertheless, despite these models, none can claim direct correlation of 
racially polarized voting among the respective minority groups they are ana-
lyzing. The issue therefore becomes tautological. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The 1994 49th Assembly district represented an ideal case study of the the-
ory expounded by Erie et al. in accessing the potential for a Latino-Asian 
Pacific American political coalition in a political district which contained cities 
with large and commingled Latino and Asian Pacific communities. The candi-
dates that will be focused on in this study are Diane Martinez and Judy Chu 
who finished first and second, respectively, in the primary with Martinez 
eventually winning the general election. As will be illustrated and argued 
later in the Findings section, Erie et al. were correct in their analysis in two 
key areas. First, commingled patterns of settlement in the cities in the 
1994 49th Assembly district represented politically charged areas among 
Latinos and Asian Pacific candidates, and thus a potential barrier existed for 
a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. Second, a formidable obstacle in 
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the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition was the lack 
of a solid registered voter base. As Browning, Marshall, and Tabb found in 
their study on the successes and failures of minority mobilization in ten 
cities, a politically effective political coalition cannot occur without a strong 
voter base: 
With only one or even with no minority representatives, a domi-
nant coalition strongly committed to minority interests might still 
be able to turn a city government around. Conversely, even sub-
stantial minority representation might have little or no effect 
where minority groups fall short of 50 percent of the voting-age 
population, as they usually do (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 
1991, p. 9) . 
This was more the case for the Asian Pacific constituency in the 1994 49th 
Assembly district primary election in which their registered voting base was 
not as large as it was for Latinos. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions will be addressed in this study in relation 
to the Erie et al. thesis regarding the formation of a viable Latino-Asian 
Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. 
Question One: To what extent were both Latinos and Asian Pacifies able to 
racially mobilize their votes and campaign contributions in favor of their 
respective candidates? 
Question Two: To what extent was there racially polarized voting among the 
Latino and Asian Pacific identified primary voters in the 1994 49th Assembly 
district primary election? 
A) If there was racially polarized voting, what were some of the political fac-
tors that attributed to it? 
Question Three: What are the implications of racially polarized voting on the 
formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in a future Los 
Angeles district? 
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF STUDY 
1. Election Precincts and Definition of Racially Polarized voting: 
Addressing The Ecological Fallacy 
In order to determine whether racially polarized voting occurred in the 1994 
49th Assembly district primary election, every tenth election precinct was 
randomly selected in all ten cities. This was done to ensure randomness 
and to maintain internal validity within the entire political district. There were 
three cities with less than ten election precincts: Rio Hondo, South San 
Gabriel, and Temple City. Subsequently, they were not counted based on 
the random selection criteria of every tenth election precinct. As a result of 
this selection criteria, the cities and the total number of their election 
precincts examined were the following: Alhambra (5), Monterey Park (4), Los 
Angeles (2), Rosemead (2), San Gabriel (2), Belvedere (1), and East Los 
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Angeles (1). It is important to note that there is no certain method to deter-
mine whether racially polarized voting actually did or did not occur among the 
Latino and Asian Pacific voters, because there was no exit poll conducted by 
either campaigns or local newspapers. Thus, one of the questions examined 
in this study is whether theoretically racially polarized voting occurred among 
both racial groups based upon the available precinct data. 
The precinct data was obtained from the Los Angeles County Office of the 
Registrar Recorder in Norwalk, and consisted of the following: official elec-
tion precinct returns per candidate; election precinct rosters; and official 
campaign contribution data. From the election precinct rosters, the sur-
names of precinct voters were divided into three categories: Latino, Asian 
Pacific , and "Other. " The category "Other" represented all surnames identi-
fied as neither Latino nor Asian Pacific. 
A combination of two thresholds was used to determine if racially polarized 
voting theoretically occurred. One threshold used was the court 's analysis 
in Thornburg v. Gingles which found that racially polarized voting occurred if 
any racial group voter (e.g. Latino voter) voted fifty percent or over for a can-
didate of the same racial group (e.g. Latino candidate) .1 The second thresh-
old used was the Pearson correlation analysis (r) which determined the 
strength of relationship between the total number of identified racial group 
election precinct voters and the total number of precinct votes received by a 
racial group candidate. Once the r is obtained, the correlation coefficient 
(r2) can also be determined. This correlation analysis could only be per-
formed on Alhambra and Monterey Park because they contained more than 
two randomly selected election precincts. It is not possible to run a pearson 
analysis in cities with less than or equal to two election precincts. 
In performing a pearson r analysis, the strength of relationship between the 
amount of Latino and Asian Pacific identified precinct voters with the amount 
of precinct votes received by Martinez and Chu can be determined. 
However, because applicable census data at the election precinct level could 
not be obtained , a regression analysis cannot be performed. Therefore, 
socio-economic status variables such as educational attainment, income, 
and generation differences cannot be factored into the equation. Such fac-
tors are recognized as being significant because to assume that all ethnic 
groups vote homogeneously is false. As a result, the strength of relationship 
can be determined from the existing precinct data, but it is not possible to 
determine whether this relationship is statistically significant. 
2. Demographic and Political Characteristics of the 1994 49th Assembly 
District 
Table 1 shows the six cities that were completely within the boundaries of 
the 1994 49th Assembly district. In five of these six cities, Asian Pacifies 
and Latinos represented the two largest racial groups. These cities repre-
sent commingled residential patterns with Latinos and Asian Pacifies. 
Table 2 shows that the Democratic Party represented a majority of the regis-
tered voters in the five largest cities. East Los Angeles represented the city 
with the largest percentage (79 %) of registered Democratic Party voters. 
This was 23 percentage points higher than the second highest percentage 
(56%) in Monterey Park. A majority of East Los Angeles Democratic Party 
registered voters were Latino. The significance of these percentages illus-
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Table 1 Latino and Asian Pacific Populations Within Selected Cities2 Source: 
Hispanic Asian Pacific White (Not of 
Cities Population Population Hispanic Oriain) 
Alhambra 29,260 31,519 20,106 
Monterey Park 18,465 34,977 7,185 
Rosemead 25,463 17,772 8,282 
San Gabriel 13,297 12,090 11,379 
East Los AnQeles 119,418 1,583 3,254 
Temple City 5,771 6,088 18,962 
Source: 1990 U.S. Bureau of Census 
trated why the 49th Assembly district voters have historically been both 
Democrat and Latino. Both of these characteristics are important to keep in 
mind in understanding the barriers to the formation of a viable Latino-Asian 
Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election . 
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE 1994 
49TH ASSEMBLY DISTRICT PRIMARY 
ELECTION 
Table 2 Political Characteristics of Selected Cities in the 1994 49th 
Assembly District 
Total Number of Democratic Party Percent of Total 
City Re_qistered Voters Re_qistered Voters Re_qistered Voters 
Alhambra 29 , 128 15,124 53% 
East Los Anaeles 8 ,076 6,366 79% 
Monterey Park 23,308 13 ,086 56% 
Rosemead 14,253 8,206 58% 
San Gabriel 13 ,330 6,479 49% 
Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information. 
The 1994 49th Assembly district primary election represented an important 
election in analyzing the potential for a bi-racial political coalition between 
Latino and Asian Pacifies in cities where commingled residential patterns 
existed. As mentioned earlier, the two main candidates running in the June 
4th Democratic primary were incumbent Diane Martinez and former Monterey 
Park mayor and current city councilwoman Judy Chu. 
The sequence of events which led both Chu and Martinez to declare their 
candidacies in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election illustrated 
the degree of political urgency that existed for both campaigns. Each cam-
paign represented minority groups which attempted to achieve greater repre-
sentation in what has historically been defined as a "Latino" district. In 
October of 1994, Martinez, the incumbent representative of the 49th 
Assembly district, announced that she was considering running for the state 
Senate seat vacated by Art Torres who decided to pursue the state 
Insurance Commissioner position. At the time of Martinez's announcement, 
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Chu put her name in as a candidate for the Assembly seat which apparently 
angered Martinez because she had deferred the seat to Hilda L. Solis, anoth-
er Latina (Holguin, 1994, B2). As a result of Chu's announcement, Martinez 
decided to seek reelection in the 49th Assembly district. According to 
Martinez, she believed that Chu should have deferred to her at that point: 
"To me, its unfortunate that someone has as much ambition that they can't 
wait their time" (Holguin, 1994, B2). 
The Martinez and Chu campaigns attempted to downplay the inter-racial ten-
sions among Latinos and Asian Pacifies in the 1994 49th Assembly district 
primary election. According to Diane Martinez, in an interview with the Los 
Angeles Times regarding the significance of race and ethnicity prior to the 
primary: "It's not really something I concern myself with. The issues are not 
about color" (Holguin, 1994, B2). Chu's response to the same question in 
the article was also devoid of the race issue: "I'm presenting myself as a 
candidate for all people" (Holguin, 1994, B3). Instead of focusing on the 
issue of race as the major issue of the primary election, both candidates 
focused on who was more qualified to achieve the common goals of improv-
ing education and the economy while reducing crime. 
Table 3 shows the official election results, both Martinez and Chu accounted 
for nearly 78 percent of the total votes. The significance of this being that it 
was a two person election. 
Table 4 shows the margin of votes between Martinez and Chu in the 
Democratic primary was less in Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and 
San Gabriel than in East Los Angeles. The reason for this can be seen in 
the fact that there existed large Latino and Asian Pacific communities within 
these cities whereas in East Los Angeles, it was a predominantly a Latino 
population. Therefore, it will be theoretically argued that racially polarized 
voting occurred among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters 
in these cities. 
According to an interview with Judy Chu, she acknowledged that race did play 
a significant role in the Democratic primary: "People who don't know you per-
sonally except by a name or face, they're going to be voting based on race." 
Chu also believed the Latino voters in East Los Angeles most likely voted for 
Martinez because of her race: "She (Martinez) is a name that sounds famil-
iar. The Latino voters in East Los Angeles, who did not know me or the 
issues of my campaign, likely voted for Martinez because she was a Latino" 
(phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 21 April 1996). In contrast, in a 
Table 3 1994 49th Assembly District Primary Election 
Results: Top Three Candidates 
Grand Total Grand Total Percent of 
Candidate Votes Casted Votes Received Grand Total 
24,635 
Diane Martinez 11,545 46.86% 
Judy Chu 7,646 31.04% 
Roy Torres 3,179 12.09% 
Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information. 
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Table 4 Total Votes Per Top Three Candidates 
In the1994 49th Assembly District 
Total Votes 



































11 4 7.39% 
439 28.43% 
1 ,622 40 . 75% 
1,569 39.42% 
483 12.14% 
982 46. 70% 
666 31.67% 
267 12.70% 
933 45. 70% 
709 34. 72% 
230 11 .26% 
16 50% 
6 18. 75% 
5 15.63% 
2,530 56. 79% 
613 13.76% 
891 20% 
Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information. 
recent interview with Susan Baker, Diane Martinez's campaign manager, she 
believed that race did not play any significant factor in either Martinez's cam-
paign strategy or the votes she received: 
In my opinion, anything that was ethnic had nothing to do with 
it...We have been raised in this country that if you are a citizen, 
you are American. This is the way we ran the campaign. We 
didn't target any one special interest group or one particular race 
(phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 25 April 1996). 
The significance of race in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election 
will be examined in the following section to determine whether or not racially 
polarized voting occurred in these heavily Latino and Asian Pacific populated 
cities. But before determining whether this occurred, the issue of whether 
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Martinez's or Chu's campaign attempted to reach out to other voters aside 
from those of their own racial group must be addressed. 
Both the Martinez and Chu campaigns attempted to appeal beyond their 
respective racial group voters in the district. The Chu campaign attempted 
to target a broad cross-racial base of voters in the 49th Assembly district. 
According to Chu: 
I definitely tried to target a broad range. I tried to canvass as 
many voters as I could. In addition, we were walking neighbor-
hoods and doing mailers. I went to a number of Latino forums 
such as the City Terrace Forum and the Mother's of East Los 
Angeles to outreach to the Latino voters (Chu, interview). 
The same strategy was employed by the Martinez campaign. As Susan 
Baker stated: "We looked at the precincts to find out where the largest num-
ber of voters were and we targeted them " (Baker, interview). 
For the Martinez campaign, there existed several beneficial factors which 
she could heavily rely upon that Chu could not. The first was that she was 
the incumbent representative of the 49th Assembly district. This meant that 
she not only understood which cities and racial groups would give her the 
necessary votes but also there existed cities with large concentrations of 
Latino voters . An example of a heavily populated Latino neighborhood is 
unincorporated East Los Angeles, in which Latinos represented over ninety 
percent of the total poll voters in three of the election precincts analyzed. It 
would be safe to assume that a majority of those Latino voters would likely 
vote for a Latino candidate whether it be Martinez or Torres. The signifi-
cance of this is that it gave Martinez a large potential voting sector which 
she could target. Secondly, like Chu, Martinez had a previous track record of 
public service in the area. Chu was the former Monterey Park mayor and cur-
rent city councilwoman, whereas Martinez was the incumbent representative 
of the 49th Assembly district. However, unlike Chu, Martinez represented a 
larger constituency which would potentially allow her to appeal to a larger 
cross-section of voters. 
Despite the large number of Asian Pacifies in Alhambra, Monterey Park, 
Rosemead, and San Gabriel, Chu was unable to translate them into votes as 
greatly as Martinez did with the Latinos in these cities. 
As seen in Table 5, Martinez captured a greater number of first place finish-
es in the election precincts of Alhambra, Monterey Park, San Gabriel, and 
Rosemead than Chu, despite the fact that the Asian Pacific population is the 
largest in each of these cities. For example, in Monterey Park, Martinez cap-
tured 23 first place precinct finishes (56% of the total) compared to Chu's 
16 first place precinct finishes (39 %), despite the fact that Asian Pacifies 
constituted 57 .5 percent of the total population. The same trend existed in 
Alhambra where Asian Pacifies represented the largest group at 38.1 percent 
of the total population. Martinez captured 43 first place election precinct fin-
ishes (84% of the total) compared to Chu 's 7 first place election precinct fin-
ishes (14% of the total) . With these general primary results in mind, there 
existed three voting trends that were found to have occurred among the 
Latino and Asian Pacific voters. 
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Table 5 Election Precinct Finishes For Three Candidates 
In 49th Assembly District Cities. 
1st Place 2nd Place 
Candidate Citv Precinct Finish Precinct Finish 
ALHAMBRA 
Diane Martinez Total N=52 43 /2 ties) 7 (2 ties) 
Judy Chu 7 (2ties) 42(1 tie) 
Rov Torres 0 /1 tie) 
MONTEREY PARK 
Diane Martinez Total N=41 23 /2 ties) 16 
Judy Chu 16 (2 ties) 22 
Roy Torres 0 1 
ROSEMEAD 
Diane Martinez Total N=22 19 3 
Judy Chu 3 19 
Rov Torres 0 0 
SAN GABRIEL 
Diane Martinez Total N=23 18 5 
Judy Chu 5 18 
Rov Torres 0 0 
EAST L.A. 
Diane Martinez Total N=12 12 0 
Judv Chu 1 
Roy Torres 0 11 
TEMPLE CITY 
Diane Martinez Total N=1 1 0 
Judv Chu 0 1 
Roy Torres 0 0 
UNINCORPORATED 
Diane Martinez Total N=28 27 1 
Judv Chu 12 (1 tie) 
























Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information. 
II. FINDINGS AND TRENDS 
Trend One: Low Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voter Turnout and High 
Campaign Contributions 
The first trend found in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election was 
a combination of a low Asian Pacific election precinct voter turnout coupled 
with a high amount of campaign contributions. In several Alhambra election 
precincts, 0150005A and 01500006A, there were eight and four identified 
Asian Pacific precinct voters out of 58 and 51 total identified voters for 15. 7 
and 7 .8 percent of the total, respectively. These findings tend to support 
previous studies of Latino and Asian Pacific racial mobilization trends in 
other local and state-wide California elections. According to Byran Jackson's 
study of the ethnic voter turnout in the 1982 and 1986 California 
Gubernatorial elections, the Asian Pacific voter turnout rate in 1986 was 27 
percentage points compared to 14 percentage points in 1982 (Jackson, 
1991, p. 212). As Jackson stated, Asian Pacific voters represented the low-
est turnout among Anglo, Latino, and African American voters. Thus, what 
were the factors which contributed to the low Asian Pacific voter turnout in 
the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election? There appear to be sever-
al factors responsible for their low voter turnout. 
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The first factor was that many of the Asian Pacific registered voters were reg-
istered immediately before the primary election. There was an intense door 
to door voter registration drive by the Chu campaign to get out the Asian 
Pacific vote. According to one Chu volunteer, 
We worked all day and morning to walk to every house in the iden-
tified Asian Pacific precincts. I would go to the houses in the 
afternoon, and if they weren't there, they were probably at work. 
I knew I had to come back either late in the evening or early in 
the morning to register them at their homes (Sy, Levin G., phone 
interview by author, Los Angeles, 7 April 1996). 
Yet despite the Chu campaign's attempt to register as many Asian Pacifies 
before the June 4th primary, many of these registered voters who did not 
vote by absentee ballots, also did not vote at the precinct polls. As Michael 
Eng, a Chu campaign strategist, stated: 
Many of the Asian Pacific Americans registered by us will not vote 
in the Democratic primary because of the fact they usually do not 
vote in the election prior to the one they are registered before. 
This is problematic among the Asian Pacific community. That's 
why they must be registered throughout the entire year and not 
just before an election (phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 
21 April 1996). 
Another interesting trend among the Asian Pacific voters was the high degree 
of absentee ballots use which was similar to previous elections. In the spe-
cial 1991 46th Assembly district primary election, there also existed a high 
degree of absentee ballot use among Korean American voters (Lai, 1994, p. 
36). In that election, the Korean American voters were targeted by the 
Korean American candidate, T.S. Chung, through absentee ballots which in 
turned allowed him to capture the largest number of absentee ballots among 
all candidates. One of the reasons for their preference for absentee ballots, 
according to Chung's campaign consultant was that "many Koreans work 
from early in the morning to late at night, so they don't have the time to go 
to the polling place" (Lai, 1994). This belief also applied to other Asian 
Pacific ethnic groups as illustrated in the 1994 49th Assembly district prima-
ry election. Judy Chu received the most absentee votes among all three 
Democratic candidates with 2,248 compared with Martinez's second most 
absentee votes of 1,757. 
A second factor contributing to the low Asian Pacifc voter turnout was the 
large percentage of foreign born Asian Pacifies during the last twenty-five 
years and the political resocialization that must occur for them to become 
familiar with mainstream political culture and institutions within their newly 
adopted homeland. Between the decades of 1970-80, the percentage of for-
eign born Asian Pacifies increased due to the increase in international migra-
tion. In 1980, 63.1 percent of all Los Angeles county Asian Pacifies were 
foreign born; the percentages among the various ethnic groups were: 
Vietnamese (92.9 %), Koreans (85.9 %), Filipinos (72.8%), and Chinese 
(70.3%) (Nakanishi, 1985, p. 33). Their need for political resocialization is 
what Lucian Pye believed to have stemmed from nativistic cultural views of 
recent Asian immigrants in his study Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural 
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Dimensions of Authority : 
In all Asian societies, including Japan, there has been an ambiva-
lence about the relationship between wealth and power. The gen-
eral view was usually one in which wealth should not properly 
lead to power ... when power was seen as properly associated with 
status, the thrust of political behavior was always in the direction 
of stability and order for the total system as well as dignity for the 
individuals at every station in society (Pye, 1984, p. 49). 
Another explanation for low voter turnout is the tendency for recent Asian 
Pacific immigrants to focus on homeland politics as opposed to American 
politics (Nakanishi, 1985, p. 47). However, as Nakanishi and others have 
argued, the term "political participation" can be manifested in alternative 
forms in American politics aside from voting such as campaign contributions. 
During the primary election, Judy Chu was able to raise the largest amount of 
individual campaign contributions. According to official campaign disclosure 
forms, the total amount of campaign contributions raised by the Judy Chu 
and Diane Martinez campaigns were $226, 108.00 and $196, 559.73, 
respectively. Thus, Chu was able to exceed Martinez in individual campaign 
contributions by nearly fourteen percent. Moreover, the official campaign 
disclosure forms indicated that a majority of Chu's individual contributors 
were Asian Pacific professionals, state workers, and small business owners. 
The combination of low Asian Pacific precinct voter turnout and large 
amounts of campaign contributions is a familiar trend in past local and state-
wide elections (Tachibana, 1986, p. 536). In contrast to Chu, many of 
Martinez's individual contributors were primarily non-Latino individuals, orga-
nizations, and companies. 3 This lack of campaign fundraising strength 
among the Latino community also represented a familiar trend in past local 
and state-wide elections (Saito, 1993, p. 60). One reason which explained 
this is that Martinez was the incumbent representative and thus she was 
able to tap into mainstream special interest groups ranging from education 
to crime fighting. The significance of the Chu campaign's ability to raise 
more contributions than the Martinez campaign is that it represented a barri-
er to the formation of a Latino-Asian political coalition. The low voter turnout 
factor had begun to change in areas like San Gabriel Valley with both the 
growing Asian Pacific population and number of registered voters. This rep-
resented a perceived threat in historically defined Latino districts like the 
1994 49th Assembly district which contained cities with large Latino and 
Asian Pacific populations. This may explain the sense of political urgency 
that underlied both the Martinez and Chu campaigns. Moreover, it may also 
explain why Martinez suddenly decided to seek reelection upon Chu's public 
announcement. Chu's political recognizability combined with the campaign 
fund-raising strength of Asian Pacifies and a growing voter base was seen by 
some Latino leaders as a threat to their political status in the 49th Assembly 
district. 
Trend Two: Racially Polarized Voting Among Latino and Asian Pacific 
Precinct Voters In All Randomly Selected Election Precincts 
The second and most significant trend found from the election precinct data 
for the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition was that 
racially polarized voting theoretically occurred among Latino and Asian Pacific 
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voters. In all of the 17 election precincts that were randomly selected and 
analyzed, it was theoretically found that the threshold of the Gingles case 
(whereby voters of a particular racial group vote 50 percent or greater for a 
candidate of the same race) was met and exceeded. Moreover, a Pearson 
regression analysis (r) was performed on the precinct data of the two most 
populated cities, Alhambra and Monterey Park. The analysis illustrated a 
very strong relationship between the total number of identified Latino and 
Asian Pacific precinct voters, on one hand, and the total number of votes 
received by the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates, on the other hand. With 
both of these findings from the precinct data, it will be theoretically argued 
that racially polarized voting occurred during the 1994 49th Assembly district 
primary election. 
The city of Alhambra represented the city with the largest number of election 
precincts (51) within the 1994 49th Assembly district. Using the random 
selection criteria of every tenth election precinct, five election precincts 
(0150014A, 0150028A, 0150044A, 0150063A, and 0150081A) were ana-
lyzed. Each of these election precincts contained a large percentage of 
Latino and Asian Pacific registered voters. 
As illustrated by the open primary results in Table 7, the total number of 
identified Latino precinct voters in all five randomly selected election 
precincts was 178. The total number of votes that the Latino candidates 
Martinez and Torres received was 212. The total number of identified Asian 
Pacific precinct voters was 100, and the total number of votes received by 
Asian Pacific candidate Judy Chu was 113. The total number of identified 
"Other" precinct voters was 318. Therefore, if racially polarized voting theo-
retically occurred in Alhambra, fifty percent or greater of the total votes that 
Martinez and Torres received must have come from the 178 identified Latino 
precinct voters in order to meet the Gingles threshold. The same argument 
can also be made for Judy Chu in which fifty percent or greater of her votes 
must have come from the total 100 identified Asian Pacific precinct voters. 
Graph 1 in the Appendix illustrates this argument, in that almost three-quar-
Table 7 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian 
Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Alhambra 
Total Number Total Number 
of ldentifed Total Total of Identified 
Alhambra Latino Martinez Torres Asian Pacific 
Election Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct 
Precincts Voters Votes Votes Voters 
0150014A 25 31 5 15 
0150028A 18 24 3 3 
0150044A 45 37 12 18 
0150063A 45 32 1 0 27 
0150081A 45 45 13 37 
Total (T) T=178 T=169 T=43 T=100 
Total Number 
of "Other" 









Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information. 
r (Total number of identified Latino precinct voters , Total number of Latino candidate votes) =.87 
r2=.75 
r (Total number of identified A/P precinct voters , Total number of Chu votes)= .96 
r2= .92 
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ters of the total Latino identified precinct voters were equivalent to the total 
number of votes Martinez received. This trend was also evident with the bar 
graphs of the total votes received by Judy Chu and the total identified Asian 
Pacific precinct voters. Therefore, the Gingles threshold of 50 percent was 
easily met and surpassed by both Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. 
However, it is important to note that this does not mean that either Martinez, 
Torres, or Chu only received votes from their respective racially identified vot-
ers, but they must also have come from the other two identified groups of 
precinct voters. What it does indicate is that a majority of the Latino and 
Asian Pacific votes were racially polarized among their respective racial can-
didates. 
A Pearson regression analysis performed on the total number of identified 
Latino precinct voters and the total number of votes received by the Latino 
candidates indicated a very strong relationship with a correlation coefficient 
(r2) of . 75. The relationship between the total number of identified Asian 
Pacific precinct voters and the total number of votes Chu received was also 
very strong in which a correlation coefficient (r2) of .92. Therefore, as a 
result of both findings, it can be argued with some degree of certainty that 
racially polarized voting occured among the Latino and Asian Pacific identi-
fied voters in Alhambra. 
Monterey Park was the city with the second largest number of election 
precincts in the 1994 49th Assembly district with a total of 41. Four ran-
domly selected election precincts were analyzed. According to Table 8, the 
total number of identified Latino precinct voters was 280. The total number 
of votes that both Latino candidates received was 223. The total number of 
Asian Pacific identified precinct voters was 88, and the total number of votes 
Chu received was 140. The total number of identified "Other" voters was 
142. If racially polarized voting were to occur in Monterey Park, as in 
Alhambra, a majority of the total identified Latino precinct voters must have 
voted for the two Latino candidates. The same must also be true for the 
total identified Asian Pacific precinct voters, a majority of whom must have 
voted for Chu. 
As seen in Graph 2 in the Appendix, over three-quarters of the total votes for 
Martinez and Torres were equivalent to the total number of identified Latino 
precinct voters. The total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters 
was equivalent to over three-fifths of the total votes for Chu. Again, as seen 
in Alhambra, the Gingles threshold was exceeded by the identified Latino 
and Asian Pacific precinct voters. 
A Pearson regression analysis performed on the Monterey Park precinct data 
indicated a strong relationship between the total number of identified Latino 
and Asian Pacific precinct voters with the total number of votes received by 
the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates. A correlation coefficient (r2) of .57 
was determined for the relationship between identified Latino precinct voters 
and the total number of votes received by both Latino candidates. An even 
higher correlation coefficient (r2) of .68 was calculated for the relationship 
between identified Asian Pacific precinct voters and votes for Chu. 
Therefore, like Alhambra, racially polarized voting more than likely occurred 
among the Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters for their respective candi-
dates during the 1994 49th Assembly primary election. 
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Table 8 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific 
Election Precinct Voters in Monterey Park 
Total Number Total Number 
Monterey of ldentifed Total Total of Identified 
Park Latino Martinez Torres Asian Pacific Total Chu 
Election Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct 
Precincts Voters Votes Votes Voters Votes 
4500016A 39 25 7 19 25 
4500030A 86 81 11 17 46 
4500046A 50 21 15 7 13 
4500090A 105 48 15 45 56 










T ; 142 
Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information . 
r (Total number of identified Latino precinct voters, Total number of Latino candidate votes); .76 
r2; _57 
r (Total number of identified A/ P precinct voters , Total number of Chu votes);.83 
r2; .68 
The significance of finding racially polarized voting in Alhambra and Monterey 
Park is that both cities constituted the two largest Latino and Asian Pacific 
populations in the 1994 49th Assembly district. In Alhambra, Latinos and 
Asian Pacifies represented 36 and 39 percent of the total population respec-
tively. In Monterey Park, Latinos and Asian Pacifies represented 30 and 58 
percent of the total population, respectively. The demographic makeup and 
voting trends of Latinos and Asian Pacifies in Alhambra and Monterey Park 
support the Erie et al. thesis that among highly commingled areas, barriers 
to political coalitions arise. 
As illustrated by Table 9, in all of the randomly selected election precincts in 
the partially incorporated cities of East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, and 
Belvedere, there was a high degree of racially polarized voting among the 
identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. In East Los Angeles, the 
total number of identified Latino precinct voters was 92 compared with the 
81 total votes for Martinez and Torres. This would result in a ratio, as illus-
trated by Graph 3 in the Appendix, of over three-quarters. In the randomly 
selected election precincts in Los Angeles , the total number of identified 
Latino precinct voters was 216 compared with the 167 total votes for 
Martinez and Torres. The ratio between these two, as illustrated by Graph 4 
(p. 36), was over three-quarters. In the one randomly selected election 
precinct of Belvedere, the total number of identified Latino election precinct 
voters was 106 compared with the 98 total votes for Martinez and Torres for 
a ratio of over three- quarters according to Graph 5. 
For the identified Asian Pacific precinct voters in these election precincts, 
there also existed a high degree of racially polarized voting. In the one elec-
tion precinct in East Los Angeles, the number of identified Asian Pacific 
precinct voters (9) was exactly equivalent to the number of total votes for 
Chu as illustrated in Graph 3 (p. 36). In the Los Angeles election precinct, 
the total number of identified Asian Pacific voters was 10 compared to the 
total 27 votes received by Chu. Based on these findings, a strong probabili-
ty existed that Chu's total votes came from a majority of the 10 identified 
Asian Pacific precinct voters and some from the precinct voters identified as 
"Other. " The significance of these findings in the above election precincts 
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Table 9 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election 
Precinct Voters in East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, and Belvedere 
Total Number Total Number Total Number 
East Los of ldentifed Total Total of Identified of "Other" 
Angeles Latino Martinez Torres Asian Pacific Total Chu Identified 
Election Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct 
Precincts Voters Votes Votes Voters Votes Voters 
4500016A 92 57 24 9 9 5 
Total (T) T=92 T=57 T=24 T=9 T=9 T=5 
Total Number Total Number Total Number 
Los of ldentifed Total Total of Identified of "Other" 
Angeles Latino Martinez Torres Asian Pacific Total Chu Identified 
Election Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct 
Precincts Voters Votes Votes Voters Votes Voters 
9000901A 122 86 12 10 20 16 
9002811A 94 57 12 0 7 12 
Total /Tl T=216 T=143 T=24 T=10 T=27 T=28 
Total Number Total Number Total Number 
of ldentifed Total Total of Identified of "Other" 
Belvedere Latino Martinez Torres Asian Pacific Total Chu Identified 
Election Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct 
Precincts Voters Votes Votes Voters Votes Voters 
0850054A 106 82 16 3 23 8 
Total (T) T=106 T=82 T=16 T=3 T=23 T=B 
Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information. 
was that the Gingles threshold was easily exceeded. Since only one or two 
randomly selected election precincts in each of these partially incorporated 
cities was chosen, a regression analysis could not be performed. 
In some cities, particularly East Los Angeles , the theoretical argument that 
racially polarized voting occurs was magnified by the disproportionate num-
ber of Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. In this heavily Latino populat-
ed city, there were 92 identified Latino precinct voters compared to 9 identi-
fied Asian Pacific precinct voters . The ratio of identified Latino precinct vot-
ers to the total votes for Martinez and Torres was almost one to one. The 
ratio of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters to the total votes for Chu was 
exactly one to one. Thus, in a city where Latinos represented 96 percent of 
the total population compared to less than 2 percent for Asian Pacifies, 
based on the above findings, there appeared to be no cross-racial voting by 
Latinos for Chu. 
According to Table 10, a high degree of racially polarized voting occured in 
the randomly selected election precincts in Rosemead and San Gabriel. In 
Rosemead, the total number of identified Latino voters was 92 compared 
with the 104 total votes for Martinez and Torres. In San Gabriel, the total 
number of identified Latino voters was 87 was almost the same as the 88 
total votes for Martinez and Chu. 
The total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters in the Rosemead 
election precincts was 42 compared with the 49 total votes Chu received. In 
the San Gabriel election precincts, there existed a total number of 22 identi-
fied Asian Pacific voters compared with the 38 total votes Chu received. As 
seen in Graph 6 and Graph 7, the Gingles test is clearly met in Rosemead 
and San Gabriel, and strongly illustrates the case that racially polarized vot-
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ing occured among Latino and Asian Pacific voters. Therefore, in the next 
section, the effects of such voting will be examined on the development and 
maintenance of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. 
Ill. THE EFFECTS OF RACIALLY POLARIZED 
VOTING ON LATINO-ASIAN PACIFIC POLITICAL 
COALITION BUILDING 
As illustrated earlier, the prospects for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coali-
tion in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election appeared very slim 
Table 10 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election 
Precinct Voters in Rosemead and San Gabriel 
Total Number Total Number Total Number 
of ldentifed Total Total of Identified of "Other" 
Rosemead Latino Martinez Torres Asian Pacific Total Chu Identified 
Election Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct 
Precincts Voters Votes Votes Voters Votes Voters 
5750017A 60 44 11 19 33 57 
5750071A 32 41 8 23 16 49 
Total (T) T=92 T=85 T=19 T=42 T=49 T=106 
Total Number Total Number Total Number 
San of ldentifed Total Total of Identified of "Other" 
Gabriel Latino Martinez Torres Asian Pacific Total Chu Identified 
Election Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct Precinct 
Precincts Voters Votes Votes Voters Votes Voters 
6100015A 50 48 2 19 18 101 
6100033A 37 34 4 3 20 118 
Total (T) T=87 T=82 T=6 T=22 T=38 T=219 
Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information. 
due to the high degree of racially polarized voting. Both Martinez and Chu 
were able to capture a large percentage of the Latino and Asian Pacific 
votes, respectively, but were unable to cross over to the opposite racial 
minority voters. As a result of racially polarized voting, a Latino-Asian Pacific 
coalition could not develop due to two important factors: 1) the concept of 
minority representation versus non-minority representation; and 2) the politi-
cal incorporation of Asian Pacifies. 
Minority versus Non-Minority Representation 
The first factor impeding a bi-racial coalition was the necessity to distinguish 
between minority versus non-minority representation. For many racial minori-
ty groups, as Browning, Marshall, and Tabb stated (Browning, Marshall, and 
Tabb, 1990, p. 5), the key struggle of local politics has centered around 
actual representation through their incorporation into a bi-racial coalition. In 
the case of African American and Latino communities in California which had 
no representatives of the same race in 1960, minority representation has 
grown to only twenty-seven African American and three Latino mayors in 
cities with populations over 50,000. As a result of the need for minority rep-
resentation, there has been increased racial representation in state and 
local positions among the Latino community, although still not proportional 
to their population. The same phenomenon also existed among the Asian 
Pacific communities in which Judy Chu attempted to become the first 
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Chinese American in the Assembly since March Fong Eu left in 1974. Thus, 
there has not been a Chinese American representative in the Assembly for 
over twenty years, although Asian Pacifies represented the fastest growing 
racial group in California (Ong and Azores, p. 2). As seen earlier with Leland 
T. Saito's study of the Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition that developed 
in 1990 centering on the redistricting and reapportionment of San Gabriel 
Valley, the underlying reason why Latino coalition leaders ultimately agreed 
to a joint redistricting plan was that it assured to them minority representa-
tion through the reelection of a Latino candidate. 
With this idea of minority representation in mind, it is understandable why 
racially polarized voting occurred among the Latino and Asian Pacific commu-
nities in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. The 49th 
Assembly district community has traditionally been viewed as a historically 
"Latino" represented community. Many of its past representatives have 
been Latino, as illustrated by Diane Martinez's victories in 1991 and 1995. 
The most important challenge faced by Latinos and by Asian Pacifies in the 
1994 49th Assembly district primary election was the urgency of obtaining a 
minority representation for themselves. This idea would support the Erie et 
al. theory that highly commingled areas would experience competition for lim-
ited political resources such as elected representatives. 
The Political Incorporation of Asian Pacifies: Its Effects Upon Established 
Racial Minority Groups and The Development of Interest Group Strategy 
A second factor which may have ultimately contributed to racially polarized 
voting is the increased political incorporation of Asian Pacifies. As men-
tioned earlier, t11ere has not been a Chinese American representative in the 
State Assembly for over twenty years, despite the fact Asian Pacifies repre-
sent the fastest growing racial group in California. Given the trend of 
increasing numbers of Asian Pacifies in an atmosphere where all minority 
racial groups strive for greater representation, it can be argued that Latinos 
perceived Asian Pacifies as a potential threat to their traditionally Latino rep-
resented district. The 1994 49th Assembly district primary election repre-
sented one Latino represented district that contained an established Latino 
voter base (East Los Angeles, Monterey Park, and Alhambra). However, in 
the last twenty years, the cities of Monterey Park, Alhambra, Rosemead, and 
San Gabriel have witnessed a large Asian Pacific population growth. As a 
result of their increased population growth in these cities, younger genera-
tion Asian Pacific individuals are slowly being politically incorporated into 
mainstream political institutions. There have been studies illustrating that 
older generation Asian Pacifies are more concerned with "homeland politics" 
than American politics (Pye, 1984, p. 49). Nonetheless, as a result of their 
acculturation into the mainstream political processes and institutions during 
the last twenty years, Asian Pacific candidates running for local positions 
(e.g. city unified school board districts, city council) and state representative 
positions (e.g. secretary of state, state treasurer) are becoming more preva-
lent in California politics. In 1993, for example, Mike Woo became the first 
Asian Pacific Los Angeles mayoral candidate to run in the nation's second 
largest city. 
With the increased political incorporation of Asian Pacifies particularly in 
cities within the 1994 49th Assembly district, Asian Pacifies own a degree of 
political clout. However, it must also be noted that sheer numerical repre-
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sentation is not enough to ensure political clout: 
The ability to mount a large-scale protest depends on the 
absolute number of people who can be mobilized to demonstrate. 
In contrast, the ability to mount a powerful electoral challenge 
depends not on numbers but on the percentage which those num-
bers constitute of the electorate (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 
1990, p. 13). 
With this point in mind, Los Angeles Asian Pacific community leaders real-
ized the political potential that the San Gabriel Valley Asian Pacific con-
stituency possessed. Los Angeles Latino community members recognized 
this potential and agreed to cooperate with Asian Pacifies leaders during the 
1990 redistricting and reapportionment process. Such a political coalition 
between both racial groups would have been unheard of in either the 1970 
or 1980 redistricting and reapportionment processes. Asian Pacifies did not 
constitute a significant population in San Gabriel during these periods. As 
one Asian Pacific coalition member succinctly put it: "I can say that Asians 
are committed to working with Latinos because the political reality is that 
Asians need Latinos more than Latinos need Asians because our population 
is smaller and we have a low number of registered votes" (Saito, 1993, p. 
61). The significance of this illustrates how the increased demographic 
growth and political incorporation of Asian Pacifies affected established 
racial minority groups' political interests. Due to the rapid population growth 
of Asian Pacifies in San Gabriel Valley over the last two decades and their 
subsequent political acculturation, Latinos realized the necessity of having to 
form a political alliance with Asians during the 1990 redistricting and reap-
portionment process. 
Historically established minorities have turned to special interest strategy as 
an effective form of political empowerment. According to Bruce Cain: 
Typically party allegiance fosters an ideology that gives logical 
coherence to or at least some reasoned connection between vari-
ous issue positions held by its followers. By comparison, groups 
adopting special interest orientation eschew permanent alliances 
for temporary partnerships of convenience and tend to prefer 
strategies that allow them to 'go it alone' (Cain, 1991, p. 15). 
The two main reasons for the adoption of special interest strategy, according 
to Cain, are the following: the diversity of interests and opinions within the 
minority communities themselves and the absence of strong political parties, 
with which minorities can identify (Cain, 1991). This may have been the situ-
ation with the Latino-Asian Pacific reapportionment coalition in which diverse 
interests within and among the two racial groups may have forced the two to 
"go it alone" in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. An exam-
ple of this strategy was the decision of the Martinez and Chu campaigns to 
run against each other in the Democratic primary as opposed to attempting 
to establish a political alliance like the 1990 Latino-Asian Pacific redistricting 
and reapportionment coalition. The competing interests that marked both 
the Martinez and Chu campaigns overrode any attempts to bridge common 
political interests among them. As will be discussed in the next section, the 
future of multi-racial coalitions in Los Angeles will depend on a new leader-
ship that must be able to bridge these competing interests. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the framework of the Erie et al. theory, it appears that the most serious 
barrier to a coalition between Latinos and Asian Pacifies in the 1994 49th 
Assembly district primary election may be political, because of their diffuse 
and commingled residential patterns. This theory is supported by two fac-
tors: first, the high degree of racially polarized voting between the two groups 
during the primary election; and second, the urgency that underlied both the 
Martinez and Chu campaigns for greater minority representation. 
The first factor which illustrated the potential barriers to a Latino-Asian 
Pacific political coalition is the trend of racially polarized voting that occurred 
in the following cities in the 1994 49th Assembly district: Alhambra, 
Monterey Park, East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Rosemead, San Gabriel, and 
Belvedere. However, the degree of racially polarized voting differed among 
these cities. In the cities with heavily populated Latino and Asian Pacific 
concentrations (Alhambra, Monterey Park, East Los Angeles), racially polar-
ized voting was high. A Pearson regression analysis of the total number of 
Latino and Asian Pacific identified precinct voters and the total number of 
votes, which the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates in Alhambra and 
Monterey Park received, showed a significant relationship. In the one elec-
tion precinct analyzed in East Los Angeles, the city with the largest Latino 
population, a strong degree of racially polarized voting occurred when com-
paring the total number of identified Latino precinct voters with the total 
number of votes received by both Martinez and Torres. In smaller incorporat-
ed areas with less Latino and Asian Pacific populations such as Belvedere 
and parts of Los Angeles, the degree of racially polarized voting was not as 
high among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. 
It is important to note the limitations of these findings for racial bloc voting 
among the Latino and Asian Pacific identified voters. Since neither cam-
paigns nor local newspapers conducted an exit poll of the 1994 49th 
Assembly district primary election, the occurrence of racially polarized voting 
could not be directly measured. Instead, a theoretical argument of racially 
polarized voting was made based on precinct and census data. Thus, it is 
recommended that a survey be developed which would target identified and 
randomly selected Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters, who voted in the 
primary election. Such surveys could provide information to explain the rea-
son(s) why they voted for a certain candidate. 
Nonetheless, the findings of the election precinct data strongly support the 
argument that racially polarized voting occurred among the identified Latino 
and Asian Pacific voters. This in turn was one of the barriers that existed 
against the formation of a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. If Latinos 
and Asian Pacific voters did in fact vote along racial lines, what was the pos-
sibility of them voting for a consensus candidate backed by a Latino-Asian 
Pacific political coalition? For example, if a Latino-Asian Pacific political 
coalition was formed that agreed to support Judy Chu as their candidate for 
the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election, would the Latino voters in 
Alhambra, Monterey Park, and East Los Angeles necessarily have voted for 
her? Further, the findings illustrated that racial representation in state and 
local elected and appointed positions is a key political issue for Latino and 
Asian Pacific communities. This belief is supported by the degree of political 
urgency that stemmed from the Chu and Martinez campaigns. Judy Chu stat-
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ed that both Latinos and Asian Pacifies were underrepresented in local gov-
ernment and thus strived for greater political incorporation. Chu believed 
that the respective groups' attempts at greater political representation nega-
tively impacted the potentials for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in 
the 49th Assembly district: "In some ways there are going to be problems in 
this (San Gabriel Valley) area because these groups make up significant per-
centages of the population and want greater political representation" (Chu, 
interview). However, Chu believed that Latinos were already making some in-
roads for greater political representation at the local and state government 
levels compared with Asian Pacifies: "There already exists a group of Latino 
Assembly representatives that are flexing their muscle. Latinos are just 
beginning to obtain political incorporation. Asians are still at the infancy 
stage in (American) politics, but I see them making significant strides in 
terms of voter registration and outreach" (Chu, interview). 
Attempts to achieve greater political incorporation into local and state repre-
sentative positions is problematic particularly when a more recent group 
begins to challenge politically a pre-established groups ' representation of a 
political district. Historically, the major cities within the 1994 49th 
Assembly district boundaries (e.g. Monterey Park, East Los Angeles , and 
Alhambra) , have been both Latino and Democratic in its constituency and 
representation . With the recent influx of Asian Pacifies primarily after the 
Immigration Act of 1965, these cities have witnessed the largest Asian 
Pacific population growth in the nation during the last twenty years (Ong and 
Azores, 1991, p. 12). Subsequently, Asian Pacifies have begun to run as 
candidates as opposed to simply being large campaign contributors to non-
Asian Pacific candidates. These trends are consistent with the Erie et al the-
ory that competition for limited political resources in highly commingled resi-
dential areas like the 1994 49th Assembly district acts as the most serious 
obstacle to the formation of a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. 
Prospects For Future Latino-Asian Pacific Political Coalitions: The Need 
For A New Coalition Leadership To Bridge Competing Interests 
Despite these findings of racially polarized voting and competition for minori-
ty representation, political coalitions between Latinos and Asian Pacifies 
might be possible in future local and state elections, particularly with the 
reconfiguration of multi-racial politics. The traditional bi-racial coalition in 
Los Angeles between White liberals and African Americans must eventually 
be reconfigured to accommodate the growing interests of Latinos and Asian 
Pacifies. As a result of these new racial groups, ttiere will be those groups 
who will likely align with others who have similar ideologies, interests, and 
leadership (Sonenshein , 1993, p. 267). According to Erie et al, the 
prospects for a political coalition between Latinos and Asian Pacifies will like-
ly rest with policies dealing with nativity and immigration issues. Along these 
lines, Sonenshein believed that the future challenge of managing multi-racial 
coalitions in the post-incorporation period of Los Angeles is the development 
of a leadership which can bridge competing interests and create new coali-
tions (1993). Thus, in the case of the 1994 49th Assembly district primary 
election, the competing interests of the Latino and Asian Pacific communi-
ties must be guided by the same type of political philosophy fostered by the 
Latino and Asian Pacific coalition leaders of the 1990 redistricting and reap-
portionment coalition in San Gabriel (Saito, 1993, p. 60). Those Asian 
Pacific coalition leaders, who were newcomers to the electoral politics 
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scene, realized the need to develop an alliance with more experienced and 
larger represented Latinos. Latino coalition leaders understood the growing 
population and campaign fundraising ability of the Asian Pacific community. 
It was this form of leadership in both communities that was able to make the 
Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition work, despite the Erie et al belief that 
political issues like redistricting and reapportionment would be a barrier to 
the formation of such a coalition. As a result of this new coalition leader-
ship, future types of bi-racial coalitions in Los Angeles, whether it be 
between Asian Pacifies and Latinos, could be possible. 
APPENDIX 
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Graph 2 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election 
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Graph 3 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election 
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